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FLOUTING THE ELMO NECESSITY AND  
DENYING THE LOCAL ROOTS OF 
INTERPRETATION:  
―ANTHROPOLOGY’S‖ QUARREL WITH ACTA AND 
AUTHORITARIAN IP REGIMES 
 




This paper uses an anthropological definition of culture to examine the 
intensification of intellectual property policing, coupled with an expansion 
of its definition.  These are ACTA’s aims.  I argue that acts of sharing lie 
at the root of communication; humans must share in order to learn.   
Furthermore, symbols change their meaning as they circulate in different 
cultural contexts.  Therefore,  in denying the fundamental importance of 
sharing and local interpretation, ACTA will not only fail spectacularly as 
a policy document.  It will also fuel a ―war‖ on file-sharers, users of 
generic medicines, and manufacturers, sellers,  and buyers of imitative 
goods and services – in sum, a large portion of the world’s population.  
This avoidable war will be costly, and it will be detrimental to public 
interests and global health.  
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I. THE QUOTIDIAN EFFECTS OF ACTA 
 
If approaches to intellectual property (IP) continue to become more 
expansive and corporate-controlled, there may come a day when speakers of 
English will have to buy ―English 2.0‖ or the like in order to talk and write.  
This is lawyer James Boyle’s contention in The Public Domain:  Enclosing 
the Commons of the Mind (2008).  With this metaphor, Boyle addresses 
much more than language.  He argues that the concept of property applies to 
a broader and broader range of expressive and material culture.  He also 
suggests that the strict policing of the boundaries of IP will soon require 
permissions and payments for resources we currently share with one 
another without a thought. 
The present essay argues that should it pass, the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (ACTA) will take us several steps closer to the fateful day 
Boyle anticipates.  It therefore targets ACTA as a policy document.  
However, I am using ACTA as a way to discuss current approaches to 
―property‖ in the boardrooms of Europe, North America, and Japan.  These 
are based on similar logic to that which underlies the United States ―Special 
301‖ process of putting developing countries on punitive ―watch lists‖ for 
ostensible violations of IP law.  This way of thinking, evidenced by 
corporations and the legal and governmental apparati that support them, 
clearly shows that there has been a cumulative and strategic loosening of 
the definition of IP, together with a ramping-up of its policing. I approach 
these phenomena as an anthropologist who has been doing research on 
language, media, and IP in the United States and Brazil for the last twelve 
years.  I therefore look at ACTA from a cultural perspective, which 
elucidates some of the harm that the treaty will do from a quotidian 
standpoint rather than the more common legal, economic, and policy points 
of view.  How, I ask, will the kinds of thinking behind ACTA shape the 
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way human beings reason, talk to each other, and frame their creative 
endeavors? 
First, I will outline the treaty for those who have no knowledge of it, 
but, in so doing, orient those who do understand its current draft to my 
particular approach.  ACTA purports to be a trade treaty, proposed by 
appointed trade-representatives of Australia, Canada, the European Union, 
Japan, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, 
Switzerland and the United States.  Its primary purpose is to stamp out what 
its framers feel is the alarming growth of what they call ―piracy‖ and 
―counterfeiting‖ (which we should refer to using the more precise descriptor 
―unauthorized use‖).  Its meetings took place clandestinely for two years 
before considerable public pressure resulted in the release of the document 
in April of 2010.  An ensuing outcry about the nature and scope of the 
treaty has, of this writing, yielded a single opportunity for public questions 
in late June of 2010.  However, when a team of scholars, lawyers and 
activists asked questions of the ACTA organizers at this short hearing they 
were often dismissed, and in some cases, their questions were even treated 
with disdain.  The clandestine nature of the process together with the 
unwitting complicity of the news media means that there has been 
alarmingly little written about ACTA.  ACTA’s unelected framers sidestep 
existing international organizations that currently govern IP such as the 
World Trade Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization, 
and the United Nations, all of them accountable to diverse international and 
national communities—some even mildly accountable to public interest 
groups.  All of this leads us to conclude that ACTA is the product of a 
closed process, carried out in an undemocratic fashion, by a group of actors 
with highly specialized interests.  These actors nonetheless have 
considerable power to impose those interests on a large portion of the 
world’s population.  (For a critical analysis of the treaty see:  
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/acta-communique). 
Three important aspects of the treaty bear underlining for the purposes 
of the present essay: 
 
1. ACTA vastly simplifies current legal and governmental definitions 
of IP.  It does so by implicitly collapsing the distinctions between 
copyright, trademark, patent, and brand.  It thus enables a uniform 
approach to policing perceived violations of laws which IP experts 
have traditionally viewed as separate. 
 
2. At the same time as ACTA loosens the definition of IP, it 
considerably augments the harshness and rapidity with which 
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violations are to be handled.  For example, medicines such as those 
sent to Africa to combat HIV, may now be confiscated in transit.  A 
second important example is that internet service providers may well 
be encouraged to gather information on their clients, cutting off 
broadband access for ―violations‖ of downloading rules.  There are 
other borderline-totalitarian aspects of the treaty’s policing 
proposals which space prevents mentioning here (once again, look at 
the link above).  It is, however, important to point out that the 
consumer-protection and exceptions clauses customary for such a 
wide-reaching treaty are simply missing from ACTA; there are few 
recourses written into the document for actors or institutions who 
consider that ACTA’s principles overstep, or have been mistakenly 
applied. 
 
3. ACTA seeks to circumvent local (in many cases, national) practices 
for handling the production and consumption of goods and services.  
It also pays no attention to culturally specific ways of addressing 
―the public good.‖  Thus, ―the public good‖ proposed by the 
unelected representatives negotiating ACTA is decidedly not the 
public good of ―BRIC‖ countries—Brazil, Russia, India, and 
China—a point that trade representatives from these nations have 
made vocally.  This is surely no coincidence, since ACTA’s framers 
pointedly exclude ―developing‖ nations from the treaty’s continuing 
composition. 
 
With this contextual material in mind, we are now in a position to 
embark on the major question of this paper.  How does ACTA, and the kind 
of thinking it represents, bring us closer to a world in which we will have to 
pay just to talk, write, and possibly even think? 
 
II. CULTURE AS DIFFERENCE 
  
―Culture‖ is a human cognitive faculty that is locally configured.
1
  In 
more detail,  culture is the specific means by which a particular group of 
human beings interprets and shapes the world around it.   As such, culture 
may not be explained simply in terms of overarching human drives such 
as ―profit,‖―politics,‖ and ―love,‖ the way it is in economics, political 
science, and psychology.  Anthropology argues that needs are locally 
configured.  Groups of people employ different—often radically 
different—ways of making sense of their surroundings, fashioning them 
into things which they find ―useful‖ by exchanging thoughts and objects 
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with one another.  
I will say more about culture shortly, but for the moment, two 
examples from the anthropological analysis of language illustrate the 
broad importance of the concept.
2
  The Hanunóo of the Phillipines have 
no word for ―color.‖  What they have are four ways of characterizing 
what we,  in English, think of as color:  relative lightness, relative 
darkness, relative presence of red, and relative presence of green.  
However, as tempting as it might be to conclude that they simply divide 
the visible spectrum in four, while we would divide it into a rainbow (of 
seven colors), there is a catch.  When pressed by anthropologists to 
discuss what we would call color, for which, recall, they have no term, 
the Hanunóo include features like freshness, durability, shininess, and 
hardness.  Their difference in this cannot be reduced to a problem of 
translation.  They are not confused when they answer.  The details of 
their ―color‖ system are difficult for us to grasp because they lie outside 
of our way of ascribing properties to objects, particularly the way we take 
chromatic features for granted.  The point is that the Hanunóo’s way of 
ascribing properties to objects is different from ours, and therefore,  the 
world-view of a Hanunóo is bound to be at least somewhat different from 
the world-view of a speaker of English, French, or Mandarin Chinese.   
A second example from speakers of Yucatec Maya, in Guatemala 
clarifies this point futher.
3
  When speakers of Yucatec refer to objects, the 
first thing their language forces them to attend to is the substance that the 
object is made out of.  We speakers of English see, for example, a table 
that may be made out of wood, metal, glass, plastic, or some combination 
of these.  Speakers of Yucatec Maya see some wood that happens to be 
shaped like a table.  This means that speakers of this Mayan language 
attend to substances more readily than we do.  We are more prone to 
think first and foremost about shapes and function.  For us,  it is simply a 
table that happens to be made out of wood.  For speakers of Yucatec, it is 
some wood shaped like a table.  
The differences illustrated by an anthropological analysis of language 
might seem trivial, but they are not.  Anyone can tell you this who has 
tried to take the foreign language she learned in the classroom and put it 
to use in the context in which the language is actually spoken on a daily 
basis.  Differences are complex, important, and, as we learn quickly 
whenever we travel, socially consequential.
4
  Linguistic differences are 
often immense, even in languages that are much closer to English than 
Hanunóo and Yucatec Maya.  Notice, for instance, what happens when 
you err in ascribing ―tu‖ in French to someone who ought to have been 
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referred to with ―vous.‖  The same applies to the distinction between ―tu‖ 
and ―usted‖ in Spanish.  The consequences may well be offense, hurt 
feelings, or dismissal.  Anthropology is concerned with understanding 
how these kinds of differences shape daily life in significant ways.  And 
this idea is at odds with the universalizing principles at the root of most 
other disciplines in the social sciences.  In short, anthropology is the last 
bastion of difference.  Anthropology’s fundamental concern with the 
meaning of our differences facilitates the following two points about 
ACTA. 
 
A. The Elmo Necessity:  Sharing 
 
One way to simplify the concept of culture is to conceive of it as a 
collection of localized resources and processes upon which people draw in 
their day-to-day affairs.  But culture is not just a toolbox filled with 
symbolic objects.  Rather, culture is a practice that is in constant motion, a 
productive capacity and tendency that arises from the fact that human 
beings are inevitably social creatures.  Culture is something that we do, but, 
crucially, it is something that we do through extremely quick processes of 
sharing.  Another example from language illustrates this point.  In order for 
a speaker of a given language to be considered competent in that language, 
she must be able to master a series of overlapping domains, minimally:  
phonology, semantics, syntax, and pragmatics.  In less technical language, 
each speaker must know how to use her lungs, tongue, soft-palate, lips, etc. 
to make sounds that other users of her language will recognize as 
meaningful.  She must also know the meanings of individual words.  She 
should understand how to combine words to make full utterances.  And she 
ought to know the appropriate ways of using all these resources 
simultaneously to carry out concrete tasks in her life, such as ordering a cup 
of coffee (perhaps using an odd Italianate lexicon), sentencing a convicted 
prisoner to death by firing squad, promising to be true in marriage, or telling 
a good joke. 
In order for this hypothetical speaker to become competent, she must 
continually share with other speakers of her language, and they must share 
with her.  This is a necessity for all language-users; it is not discretionary.  
She borrows sounds, words, grammatical processes, and ways of saying 
things.  Indeed, the very process of language learning itself may be 
conceived of as a process of concerted borrowing, where children are 
encouraged to ―pick up‖ the expressions of their parents and guardians.  
And we should note that this is not a controversial bit of socialist dogma.  It 
is an accepted principle of child-language socialization under a variety of 
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forms of capitalism.  For instance, there is widespread acceptance of the 
importance of this idea in children’s television programs.  Note ―Elmo’s 
Song‖ from the popular Sesame Street show, in which a carefree furry red 
monster encourages his friends Big Bird and Snuffleupagus to ―appropriate‖ 
his song, substituting their own names for his in its title; when they admire 
his creation, and wish they had thought of doing something like it, he 
simply tells them to make it their own by singing it not as he has done (as 
Elmo’s song) but as ―Big Bird’s Song,‖ or ―Snuffy’s Song.‖  No need to be 
jealous—just make it yours.  This Sesame Street sequence ends when the 
music stops, and Elmo goes off in search of others to whom he can give his 
song (the ―source‖ of this segment is not cited here, because Elmo would 
want it that way).  On a more strictly academic note, consider the work of 
Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975), a Russian philosopher of language whose 
ideas have been used extensively by anthropologists (and who will re-
appear in the conclusion, below).  Bakhtin explained the Elmo Necessity 
this way; he proposed that our words are never wholly our own; they have 
always spent time in other people’s mouths (1981). 
The point is that the very process by which human beings live in the 
world requires continual sharing.  This process has, in the discipline of 
linguistic anthropology, been referred to with the technical-sounding term 
―inter-discursivity‖ (Agha 2005).  This term simply sums up what I’ve been 
saying:  that discourse, our day-to-day communications, rely not only on 
our ability to share with one another quickly and seamlessly, but on the 
fundamental necessity of doing so.  We must lend and borrow quickly in 
order to exist in the world.  Otherwise, we would never come to know the 
meaning and appropriate placement of words like ―otherwise.‖  We are all 
Elmo, Big Bird, and Snuffy, all the time. 
Hopefully, the impact of this insight on ACTA and its incumbent ideas 
is already beginning to emerge.  But in case it is not already evident, I will 
be more explicit.  Hyper-strict IP regimes that define most expressive and 
material culture as ―property‖ encroach on this fundamentally human 
process.  They seek to insert into human life a check or tick—a moment in 
which each communicator must ask himself:  ―Who owns this?  Whose 
permission must I ask in order to do what I am about to do, or say what I am 
about to say?‖  What I call the solidification of IP regimes that ACTA 
represents thus puts a kind of stutter into our speaking, and a filter into our 
listening.  In expanding the definition of IP, ACTA pushes this tendency 
further and promises to naturalize it in a broader and broader range of 
situations.  It is already there every time we cross a border, turn on our 
computer, or listen to songs and speeches.  My point is that with the 
expansion of IP regimes, it is going to go further.  And with its progress, we 
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are increasingly being asked to carry a fearful vigilance with respect to the 
provenance of our thoughts and doings.  Imagine a world in which we must 
footnote every word we use, or, if this seems to push things too far, in 
which we must footnote a large number of the expressions we currently take 
for granted (expressions like ―take for granted,‖ for instance).  In a different 
mode, imagine a world in which Universal Music Inc. requires payment 
every time a song-writer chooses to compose in the key of C.  We will all 
have to start talking, writing, thinking, and singing much more slowly, and 
in a more limited way.   
 
B. The Necessity of the Local:  Circulation 
 
So far, we have examined the way in which the concept of culture helps 
us to see the flawed logic at the root of runaway IP policies and laws 
broadly speaking.  Now, we move on to a more difficult argument that more 
directly engages with ACTA itself. 
Something quite specific has frustrated ACTA’s framers and the 
companies they represent, and has led directly to ACTA.  That frustration 
has to do with the way in which things they perceive to be pirated or 
counterfeited can be manufactured and then travel to their intended 
destinations without being stopped.  This takes place because the local laws 
that apply to commodities differ, a factor that becomes particularly 
pronounced when commodities or services move from one place to another.  
A given good or service might be conceivable as illegal in France, but it is 
not necessarily illegal sitting in a port in São Paulo.  An HIV-controlling 
medicine on its way to an African nation, but manufactured in 
circumvention of certain American patent laws, can be legal in one place, 
and illegal in another.  Under current trade laws, that medicine gets to its 
destination and assists with combating a worldwide epidemic.  ACTA’s 
framers do not like this, though they might, if pressed, accept that 
combating an epidemic is a good thing.  They are upset that that medicine 
arrived because it reduced the patent-holder’s profits. 
By aiming to stamp out this sort of thing, ACTA attempts to 
universalize the principles by which something can be defined as 
counterfeited or pirated.  The trade representatives of the interests involved 
want certain kinds of goods and services to become universally illegal.  
This would theoretically close the existing pathways that have allowed life-
saving medicines to be cheaply manufactured and moved, for instance.  And 
it would foreclose many anonymous and unregulated aspects of the Internet 
as well, as internet service providers receive pressure to gather information 
on clients, cutting off broadband access as punishment for downloading 





  The hope is that ―counterfeited‖ or ―pirated‖ goods can 
no longer move with impunity.  And the definitions of ―counterfeited‖ and 
―pirated‖ will be much broader.  Whether applied to a song or a pill, the 
given commodity or practice will now be conceived of as ―pirated‖ 
everywhere.  Moreover, it is ―pirated‖ or ―counterfeited‖ while it is in 
motion, not just when it stops somewhere that happens to have laws that are 
hostile to it.   In ACTA, what we have, therefore, is a peremptory 
interpretive template to be applied to any and all goods and services, all the 
time.  We can therefore see that ACTA is an attempt to eradicate what 
anthropologists have spent a great deal of time not only documenting, but 
taking seriously as a part of human nature:  that groups of people interpret 
symbols and actions differently. 
For those who may doubt the global effects of ACTA, because it is 
merely one trade treaty which will not be ratified by many nations, we need 
to explore the issue further.  Let us ask the question:  Why will ACTA’s 
influence be profound and global, not contained within the countries that 
framed it?  Here, we need to follow our anthropological insight that given 
meanings are inevitably local in their configuration.  Those effects will 
differ from context to context.  Let us look at the example of lawmakers in 
developing countries within this framework.  This is similar to, but a good 
deal more complicated than, our discussion of Elmo. 
We know that lawmakers in developing countries have shown 
themselves prone to absorb aspects of policies like ACTA into their local 
legal structures.  They do this for two reasons.  The first is that these 
policies seem attractive as ―what the developed countries are doing these 
days‖; if the developed countries are doing it, it must be intelligent, the 
fallacy goes.   However, developing countries also do this because large 
countries, such as the United States, classify a nation as being ―in violation‖ 
of certain trade principles and place it on a ―watch-list‖ if it does not 
comply with such policies.  Being on this list can result in sanctions, tariffs, 
and other kinds of penalties and negative consequences.  Those seeking 
historical proof of the fact that both of these paths lead to the absorption, in 
developing countries, of sweeping policy documents framed in the 
metropole, needn’t look far.  This is precisely what happened with the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which was penned in the 
United States by the likes of the RIAA (the Recording Industry Association 
of America) but ended up being absorbed by countless developing nations, 
often leading to policies that were scandalously ill-suited to development.  
And we should note, returning more specifically to ACTA, that this 
absorption is happening already in Africa and South America, where 
draconian IP regimes are being adopted in some countries.  We may 
10 Flouting the Elmo Necessity 
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP 
therefore conclude that in one sense, ACTA’s reach will be wide. 
However, a second, and much more important point also emerges.  The 
concept of culture shows us that ACTA’s attempt to erase the efficacy of 
local context can only ever be partial, uneven, and inconsistent.  Its attempt 
to universalize the meanings of goods and services can never work in the 
way it is intended to precisely because groups of human beings create 
difference in processes of circulation.  Above, I have described this in terms 
of culture, but allow me to briefly mobilize anthropology’s other master-
trope, evolution, before returning to culture once more.  From an 
evolutionary perspective, humans are difference-creating organisms bar-
none.  It’s what we do.  Organisms with extremely strict systems tend to die 
out, but human beings continue to thrive through dramatic social and 
climatic changes because we are always shifting, moving and changing.  
Anthropological studies of language (expressive culture) and objects 
(material culture) point out that the meanings of objects and words simply 
have to change as they circulate; it is an inherent property of human 
communication.  Once again, as with the Elmo Necessity, this is not 
discretionary, but inevitable. 
Permit two illustrations of this point.  Consider the example of a 
particular kind of tropical commodity:  the pineapple.  In Central America 
or the Caribbean, a pineapple is a crop grown for export—a common 
though tasty food that is mass-produced largely for foreign markets, 
cheaply, and in a way that is managed by large multi-nationals such as 
Dole.  This carries with it local ambiguities.  Yes, Dole has brought 
employment.  But it has also been harsh, at times, in its policing of labor 
rules, and has even attempted to co-opt entire Central American political 
systems.  These characteristics become part of the symbolic makeup of ―the 
pineapple‖ in places where it is grown, which are localized interpretations 
of the pineapple as a thing.  Now, we make a leap.  A long way from its 
place of origin, in my local Safeway in Washington, DC, a pineapple is a 
somewhat exotic tropical fruit that my two-year-old son devours at an 
alarming rate.  And, further, given that my particular Safeway has a wildly 
erratic produce department, the quality of its pineapples also varies 
drastically.  In the highly localized environment of my home, located in the 
Columbia Heights neighborhood of Washington, DC, the pineapple is 
therefore a fruit of tremendously uneven quality and high status that is 
stripped entirely of the political associations it might have held closer to 
where it was produced.
6
  If I pull freshly cut pineapple out of the fridge at 
the correct moment, calm prevails.  If I fail to do so, the consequences may 
be dire, and the tantrum explosive.  The point across these two sites is that a 
pineapple is never just a pineapple.  A simultaneously clearer and more 
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extreme example from language further illustrates this point about the 
variation that context brings.  The use of the racial epithet ―n_ _ g _ r‖ to 
describe a person of African descent means radically different things when 
it emanates from ―black‖ or ―white‖ mouths.  More specifically, when a 
white university president uses the ―n‖ word in a speech it means something 
quite different than when rapper Fifty Cent uses it in a song.   There’s just 
no way around it.  This word has a variety of meanings that depend entirely 
on the who, what, where, when, and why of its use. 
At the root of the anthropology not just of language but of all material 
and expressive culture, therefore, is the notion that local groups decide the 
meanings of things in context.  And, simply put, ACTA and the kind of 
rigid and poorly conceived IP regime for which it stands, seeks to erase 
contexts, creating one overarching paradigm for interpreting not just 
commodities, but also copyrightable artistic and expressive productions.  It 
is an attempt at communicative universality.  So, from this anthropological 
point of view, we should note that ACTA has been penned by people who 
simply don’t understand how human beings function on an empirical level.  
Why is this important?  It leads to an unsettling conclusion about the 
actual effect ACTA will have.  What ACTA will do is create a chaotic 
patchwork, where policies and laws that impose ACTA’s universalized 
demands may be put into place.  However, those who put these into practice 
and police them on the ground will have to negotiate with localized 
criticisms of: the high price of international brands, the way foreign 
companies who sell products in developing economies often do not reinvest 
their profits in those markets, and the ways in which the costs of branded, 
trademarked, copyrighted, and patented goods are not calibrated for sale in 
developing markets, where wages are lower (in other words, a ―legitimate‖ 
CD takes up a much higher percentage of an average income in Brazil than 
it does in Canada). 
This is therefore not a simplistic argument that ACTA represents the 
imposition of ―foreign‖ laws on developing contexts, and that that is the 
reason it will fail.  To illustrate, it is certainly true that the fight to impose 
ACTA’s universalist interpretations will prove violent and expensive at 
times.  This will not just be the case in the developing world; there will be 
plenty of push-back in the very countries that are framing the treaty, and 
indeed, there already is.  But my more important point is that something 
else will happen in the developing world.  There, in places like Africa and 
South America, ACTA will find not only passionate opposition, but, 
perhaps paradoxically, passionate support.  And these supporters will find 
highly localized reasons for liking what ACTA has to say.  In Brazil, for 
instance, proponents of ACTA-like IP regimes are drawing on a long 
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historical tradition.  Brazil frequently considers itself to be a mecca of 
cultural mixture.  However, there are also longstanding fears associated 
with too much mixture.  And it is these fears of over-mixing that are being 
channeled by ACTA’s supporters, who perceive ―piracy‖ and 
―counterfeiting‖ as evidence of unchecked and unhealthy symbolic inter-
breeding.  What this specific case reveals is that the imposition of these 
largely American, European, and Japanese corporate IP paradigms onto the 
rest of the world will take a variety of different shapes, aggravating pre-
existing conflicts, and creating uneven approaches.  They will have a 
tremendous influence on policy and law, and a more circumscribed 
influence on policing and local thought, which are rooted in localized 
critiques of IP and its results.  The consequent incongruity will create new 
tensions and inflame old ones. 
 
III. AUTHORITARIANISM AND RIGID IP 
 
My point is not just that we have seen this kind of thing before, as the 
work of historian Adrian Johns has so clearly showed (2010).  Rather, the 
anthropological argument I am making here is that human beings 
manufacture difference in processes of exchanging thoughts and ideas.  
ACTA seeks to erase that difference.  ACTA therefore cannot work, even 
according to the stated and unstated desires of its framers.  It will generate 
expense and violence, and it will entirely fail to universalize global 
approaches to ―property.‖ 
In research I am currently carrying out in Brazil I have found that 
internationally funded NGOs that police infractions of IP are bringing 
increasing awareness of IP and its ―violations‖ to the public sector.  They 
are doing this by pressuring local police forces to engage in punitive raids 
of, for example, illegal DVD and CD stands.  They are also running anti-
piracy ads, printing anti-piracy comic books that teach kids that The Elmo 
Necessity is, in fact, immoral, pressing the news media to run stories on 
piratical ties to ―organized crime,‖ and aggressively lobbying at the federal 
level for policy changes that will make punishments for counterfeiting 
easier to hand out and worse to receive.  The result of this array of actions, 
many of them paid for by the likes of the Motion Picture Association of 
America, the RIAA, and the International Chamber of Commerce, is a 
vastly increased number of punitive raids on informal economies.  There is, 
as of yet, no evidence whatsoever that it has slowed rates of ―piracy‖ one 
jot.  But what is taking place as a result of these actions is that copying, and 
most ―informal‖ economic activity, is heading straight into the hands of 
organized crime apparati that were established in the seventies and eighties 
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to handle drugs, prostitution, and arms.  This is making informal economic 
activity, which is a tremendously important source of employment in 
countries such as Brazil, much more dangerous for all involved (while, 
incidentally, making it harder to study). 
All of this means that a new kind of war has begun, and it is a war that 
resembles the war on drugs in terms of the kinds of rhetorical strategies that 
it employs.  Because of the impossibility of universalizing the interpretation 
of things and ideas, the new ―war‖ on piracy promises to be an expensive 
and spectacular failure.  My reasons for this belief stem from the 
anthropological concept of culture.  ACTA’s universalizations will insert 
into the human communicative process (or Elmo Necessity) a stutter, tick, 
or check.  Second, ACTA will unsuccessfully attempt to erase the 
significance of local context in the production, circulation, and 
interpretation of goods and services.  But in so doing, ACTA will 
dramatically succeed on another front; it will aggravate existing inequalities 
and conflicts. 
To elucidate the significance of these two points in conclusion, I return 
to Mikhail Bakhtin, who was imprisoned several times in Stalinist Russia 
for arguing against the totalitarian use of language.  Bakhtin called the kinds 
of policies I have described here  ―authoritative discourse,‖ by which he 
meant discourse that attempts to tightly control its own interpretation, as 
well as the incumbent discourse of others.  His terminology tips us off to the 
authoritarian linguistic impulses behind trade treaties such as ACTA.  We 
may also recognize such approaches in the ―Newspeak‖ of George Orwell’s 
dystopian novel 1984, for instance.  At one point, a character in Orwell’s 
prescient book wonders at the ―beauty‖ inherent in the destruction of words.  
ACTA’s framers, and those who would support them around the world, 
would surely feel that the destruction of contexts in which a ―counterfeit‖ 
HIV drug might be read as a ―life-saving and necessary measure‖ is also, in 
some sense, ―beautiful.‖ 
                                         
1
 My definition draws upon the work of six scholars in particular: Benjamin Lee 
Whorf (1956), Marshall Sahlins (1976; 1985; 1998), Terence Turner (1979; 1986; 1992), 
Micheal Silverstein (1981; 1981; 1993), and Jean and John Comaroff (1991; 1992; 1992).  
There has been considerable debate within anthropology as to the meaning of the term 
culture, some of it productive of theoretical innovation (see, for instance, some of the 
contributions to Clifford and Marcus 1986).  
2
 The majority of this paragraph draws heavily on the work of Conklin (1964). 
3
 This paragraph draws on the work of Gaskins and Lucy (2001; 2003). 
4
 In a non-specialist mode, humorist David Sedaris’s book Me Talk Pretty One Day 
analyzes some of the pratfalls that take place as he learns French (2001). 
5
 Such laws are already on the books in France and England, though they are so 
problematic from the perspective of freedom of speech that no one has yet had the temerity 
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to enforce them. 
6
 For a suggestive attempt to trace the history and different meanings of a different 
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